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Profit Sharing in Mexico
JOHN W. SCHMITZ*
Concepts of profit sharing vary almost without limit, differing from
contract to contract and from country to country. The concepts range from
the extreme of the U.S., where no profit sharing is required, to the extreme
of Peru,2 where the government wants workers to own a third of all private
enterprises. Until fairly recently, Mexico could be considered to be
somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.
The 1917 Mexican Constitution provided for mandatory profit sharing,
but, until 1962, no federal legislation was passed to implement this provi-
sion. Therefore, what profit sharing did exist depended primarily on private
contracts and collective bargaining agreements. The 1962 law, opposed by
socialists for fear it would weaken worker opposition to the capitalist
system, 4 changed this situation. By requiring that all business enterprises
distribute a portion of their after tax profits to their employees on an annual
basis,5 it effected a distribution of profits ranging from 2.8 to 12.6 percent
of a firm's net income. 6 Eventually, this inconsistency prompted the enact-
*J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. Stanford University. Mr.
Schmitz is Managing Editor of the Lawyer of the Americas.
1. In the United States, profit sharing is based on contractual agreements between em-
ployer and employee. On profit sharing in the United States, see P. Drucker, Management, at
190-1, 292-5 (1974); B. Metzger, Profit Sharing In Perspective (Profit Sharing Research Foun-
dation ed. 1966); B. Metzger, Profit Sharing in 38 Large Companies (1976); Bergman, Pension,
Profit-Sharing Plans, Etc. - Selection. 205-3rd T.M.; Sollee and Shapiro, (ERISA) - Profit
Sharing Plans - Qualification, 310 T.M.; Hancock, Planning and Drafting Qualified Profit
Sharing Plans, 25 Bus. Law, 1561 (1970); Miller, Primer on Pension and Profit Sharing Plans -
a Perspective for the General Practitioner, 27 Bus. Law. 451 (1972); Savitz, Profit Sharing
Primer, 14 Prac. Law. 49 (1968); and Stewart & Haines, Employee Benefit Plans, 23 Rutgers L.
Rev. 681 (1969).
2. In Peru, profit sharing is strictly mandatory, based on supplementary legislation to Ar-
ticle 45 of the Peruvian Constitution, which now obligates all private companies to give certain
workers 15 percent of net profits, plus representation on the board of directors, in addition to
the 10 percent of net profits that goes to all workers as ordinary profit sharing. Decree 21,789,
issued February 2, 1977,
3. See discussion on pages 12-19, infra, concerning the history of profit sharing in Mexico.
4. Lecture given by Alejandro Ogarrio, Member of the National Commission for the Fix-
ing of Minimum Wages, at the Escuela Libre de Derecho in Mexico City on July 6, 1977.
5. Decree published in the Diario Oficial of November 21, 1962.
6. Hoagland, Company Formation in Mexico, at D-25 (1972).
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ment of a flat rate of 8 percent7 that today establishes Mexico as one of the
nations most committed to the idea of profit sharing.
Recent legislation," dealing with the related concept of worker control,
confirms this view. The legislation departs drastically from traditional
property concepts, creating a new form of economic organization, the
sociedad de solidaridad social (social solidarity society), composed solely of
workers, exercising complete control, benefiting from all the profits, and
striving to achieve a number of social goals. The assets of a sociedad are of a
"collective nature." 9 The assets may initially consist of contributions made
by members or by official institutions, persons or corporations not belong-
ing to the sociedad, and the assets may be increased by purchases of
necessary goods (financed, if necessary, by loans from national credit in-
stitutions, which are obligated to give preference to a sociedad)0 , but once
the assets are acquired, they are irrevocably devoted toward serving the
sociedad's social purposes."
These purposes are set by law. They are: (1) The creation of jobs; (2) the
conservation and improvement of the environment; (3) the rational ex-
ploitation of natural resources; (4) the production, industrialization and
marketing of necessary goods and services; (5) the education of sociedad
members and their families; (6) the improvement of the members' standard
of living; (7) the affirmation of national civic values; (8) the defense of Mex-
ico's political, cultural and economic independence; and (9) the practice of
social solidarity.' 2 What these purposes indicate is the formation of an entity
far more similar to the Peruvian comunidad industrial than to the traditional
capitalist enterprise, characterized by single-minded devotion to'one goal:
profit maximization. These purposes, when viewed in light of other provi-
sions governing the sociedad de solidaridad social, ' 3 may indeed indicate the
eventual destruction of the concept of private property in Mexico and the
dawning of a new economic system.
7. Resoluci6n de la Segunda Comisi6n Nacional para la Participaci6n de los Trabajadores
en las Utilidades de las Empresas, article 1, as published in the Diario Oficial of October 14,
1974.
8. Ley de Sociedades de Solidaridad Social, as published in the Diario Oficial of May 27,
1976.
9..Id., art. 1.
10. Id., art. 37.
11. Id., art. 10.
12. Id., art. 2.
13. An example is art. 30 which raises the possibility that a worker may be permitted to
benefit from the sociedad's profits only while he is in the organization, thus requiring him to
forfeit his investment to the state upon his departure. See. Bus. Latin Am., June 23, 1976, at
194.
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Presently, of course, this does not seem likely to occur.' 4 However, the
private sector in Mexico fears that sociedades de solidaridad social may
gradually be used to destroy private business.II It fears that industrial enter-
prises run by workers may be used as a new form of unfair competition,
based on special privileges granted by the federal government, namely, the
assured preferential access to local credit,' 6 the potential exemption from
social security payments, 1" and the possible receipt of federal subsidies. The
result of such a policy may be the same as the result of Peru's six-year effort
to achieve 50 percent worker ownership of all private enterprises: total dis-
couragement of private sector investment initiative and, because of insuf-
ficient individual incentives, worker dissatisfaction."
This article avoids supporting such a pessimistic view of the eventual ef-
fect of the law creating the sociedades de solidaridad social. It instead at-
tempts to treat profit sharing optimistically. First, it examines the
philosophy of profit sharing, revealing the high and potentially realistic
hopes that scholars and politicians have for profit sharing, so as to indicate
that mandatory profit sharing may benefit private enterprise as well as the
labor force, rather than operate as a discouragement to investment. Second,
it examines the legal history of profit sharing in Mexico, indicating that
worker participation has deep roots in the Mexican system. Third, it ex-
amines the Mexican law of profit sharing as it exists today, providing for the
investor a guide to determining the exact impact that this legislation will
have on any enterprise, and offering to the student of labor relations an in-
troduction to several novel ideas on how to implement the goals of profit
sharing. Finally, this article attempts to determine the implications of Mex-
ico's legislation, not only for Mexico, but also for the investor, for the
worker, and for the other countries interested in worker participation.
14. One observer stated that the enactment of the law on sociedades de solidaridad social is
another example of "the Mexican government's habit of passing damaging legislation, letting it
lie dormant for a while and then uncorking it for some specific purpose at a chosen time." Bus.
Latin Am., June 23, 1976, at 194.
15. Bus. Latin Am., supra note 14.
16. Ley de Sociedades de Solidaridad Social, supra note 8, art. 37.
17. Id., art. 35.
18. See Bus. Latin Am., February 16, 1977, at 49.
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I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROFIT SHARING
The political rhetoric in Mexico refrains from characterizing profit
sharing as more than a means of income redistribution.' 9 Yet the writings of
Mexican scholars reveal that Mexico's leaders may well believe that profit
sharing is indeed something more, perhaps even something revolutionary. 0
The leading scholar on the subject, Alfonso Alvirez Friscione, lists the
following benefits to be derived from profit sharing. For the worker he sees
it as supplementing a salary, encouraging saving, providing security, and
aiding emotional well-being. For the businessman he sees it as improving
the effort of the workers and insuring the workers' loyalty to the enterprise.
For the business itself he sees it as increasing productivity, encouraging un-
ity, complementing wages and salaries, and thereby bettering relations bet-
ween the workers and their employers. Finally, for society he sees it as
providing the best means to share the national wealth, avoiding strikes,
diminishing social conflicts, stopping the war between classes, and
preventing the rise of a communistic or totalitarian regime. Alvirez also con-
tends that profit sharing serves to give workers a greater sense of their own
dignity.2
Alvirez, in arguing that profit sharing may even be revolutionary, notes
that there are three forms of capitalism: the traditional type, where the law
of supply and demand controls the relationship between employer and em-
ployee; the U.S. type, where the state effectively balances the bargaining
power of both; and the experimental type, where individual businesses, par-
ticularly in the United States and Germany, attempt to act on their own to
make the relationship between employer and employee more equitable.22 In
the first, workers are bought as if they were products and are assigned
19. However, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, the recent President of Mexico, stated that, "'I ex-
hort the workers to contribute with greater eagerness to national progress and to always defend
their rights with energy and integrity. I exhort the businessmen, equally, to prove, every day,
their determination to promote, in liberty, an order more just for all . . . Arduous are the
works that await us." But with its footing injustice, "production must increase. The fruits of
the wealth generated by all must, (instead of) expanding differences between compatriots, im-
pel, by means of an expanded popular consumption and a balanced popular system of finance,
the development of the country." Speech presented before the Second National Commission on
the Participation of the Workers in the Profits of Business Enterprises, October 14, 1974.
20. The most important works by Mexican scholars on profit sharing include: A. Alvirez
Friscione, La Participacion de Utilidades (1976); B. Cavazos Flores, El Derecho del Trabajo en
la Teoria y en la Practica 89-158 (1972); M. de la Cueva, Derecho Mexicano del Trabajo,
Volume 1 677-693 (1974); M. de la Cueva, El Nuevo Derecho Mexicano del Trabajo 320-339
(1974); E. Guerrero, Manual de Derecho del Trabajo 159-183 (1973); B. Margain Hugo,
Reparto de Utilidades (1964); F. Padilla G. & F. Lerdo de Tejada, La Participacion de
Utilidades en la Nueva Ley Federal del Trabajo (1972); and L. Recasens Siches, Aspectos
Sociologicos de la Participaci6n de Utilidades (1963).
21. A. Alvirez Friscione, supra note 20, at 663.
22. Id. at 123-24.
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limited functions in the overall production. In the second, workers are
afforded a greater status and are seen as integral to production. In the third,
the personality of the worker is taken into account, raising his status still
further, recognizing him not only as a collaborator in a business effort, but
also as a human being. It is this third type that Alvirez says could be the
basis of a new economic system."
Alvirez states that an enterprise must function as "an association of
persons," in which each worker cooperates fully with all his spiritual and
physical effort to achieve the greatest possible success in an atmosphere of
confidence and friendship, of mutual identification and common purpose.',
This is a vision of an effective association between capital and labor that
gives rise to "a new economic science, that centers the economy on the con-
cept of man as a being with moral dignity."25 In practical terms this means
that, "Profit sharing can and must be an essential part of a new economic
system"2 6 that will triumph over the old promises of individualism and the
false hopes of collectivism, both of which have brought misery, depression,
and even enslavement of workers. 7
If used properly, it can be a mechanism to effect social peace in both a
material and spiritual sense. It could virtually eliminate obvious hindrances
to production - lockouts, strikes, etc. - and could also work to eliminate
the less obvious state of tension that perpetually exists in most employer-
employee relations. Not all conflict could be eliminated, of course, since
conflict is inherent to the human condition. But, says Alvirez, profit sharing
does considerably improve social relations in business enterprises, as in-
dicated by the successful profit sharing plans carried out in Switzerland, the
United States, Germany, and other countries."5
The unions, of course, have often fought profit sharing for fear it will
weaken the will of the working class to continue the traditional fight against
the owners of production." The unions also have feared that profit sharing
would compromise the right to strike, or that it would be an excuse by which
salaries would be diminished. In fact, one scholar argued that profit sharing
in any form should be resisted, because it could become so important as to
replace wages and thereby put workers in a highly insecure position. 0
Another scholar simply called the entire idea of profit sharing unjust, since a
worker in one factory with poor facilities or poor management could per-
23. Id. at 179.
24. Id. at 124.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 179.
27. Id. at 180.
28. Id. at 181.
29. Id. at 653.
30. Id.
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form the same services as a worker in another factory with better facilities or
better management, yet receive a smaller sum as profits, or no profits at all,
due solely to the place of his employment. 3
Alvirez answers these objections by stating that even if these objections
proved to have foundation, profit sharing should nevertheless proceed to be
implemented because its advantages far outweigh its disadvantages.3" In-
stead of placating the unions' fears, he contends that, in passing and im-
plementing profit sharing legislation, the state does not interfere in in-
dustrial relations solely for the workers' benefit. Going beyond what the
politicians have attributed to profit sharing, (namely the potential for
providing a better means for income redistribution and a more secure foun-
dation for balanced economic development) Alvirez argues that labor
legislation has a purpose that is more lofty and moral than the granting of
benefits to one group in society at the expense of the other. He contends
that, instead of offering an unearned increment to employees' income, labor
legislation should be directed toward protecting the spirit of industry by ser-
ving the reasonable interests of capital while augmenting workers' wages.33
Although not reflected for the most part in the nation's political
rhetoric, this philosophy, which has its roots in teachings of the Catholic
Church, as well as in the experiences of private industry, may inspire Mex-
ico's political leaders to actually build, as Echeverria said, "an order more
just for all." 34 Yet this philosophy, as best expressed by Alvirez, may be just
as likely to inspire radical changes in the Mexican system, such as those
made possible by the institution of the sociedad de solidaridad social, which
would be detrimental to the interests of capital and therefore, as Alvirez
argues, counterproductive for labor as well as capital.3" However, to twist
the philosophy of profit sharing in such a manner would undermine the
achievement of the historical goals of profit sharing in Mexico.
It. THE HISTORY OF PROFIT SHARING
In 1856, it was said before the commission charged with writing a new
Constitution for Mexico that, "The true social problem is how to eman-
cipate the day-labourers from the capitalists. The solution is very simple:
convert work into capital. This operation, demanded by justice, will assure
to the day-labourer not only the salary that corresponds to his subsistence




32. Id. at 187.
33. Id. at 187-88.
34. See note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
35. A. Alvirez Friscione, supra note 20, at 188.
36. Id. at 251. On the commission see F. Zarco, Historia del Congreso Constituyente de
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This statement did not convince the commission that profit sharing
should be incorporated as a basic principle of the new Mexican system, but
it was duly noted as the first significant expression of the idea that labor
relations could be improved through profit sharing. Whatever influence the
statement may have had is unclear. Yet it does appear to outline the think-
ing of Antonio Sarabia, who proposed in 1914 that a Regulatory Law to Ar-
ticle Five of the Constitution of 1857 be adopted, a law which would assure
that fifty percent of the profits of most enterprises be distributed to the
workers) 7 Unlike the statement of 1856, this proposal had a tangible effect.
Along with other less extreme proposals, it foreshadowed the enactment of
the first legal provisions on profit sharing in Mexico, Sections VI and IX of
Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917.11 These provisions did not constitute
the all-encompassing piece of legislation that the advocates of profit sharing
had envisoned, for they required complementary state legislation to be effec-
tive, but they did form a solid basis for future efforts to implement more am-
bitious profit sharing plans.
Some states did not pass the necessary complementary legislation and
others passed legislation which implemented Article 123, but which did not
give effect to the profit sharing provisions. These states included Chiapa,
Durango, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, San Luis
Potosi, Tlaxcala, and the Federal District. 9 The other states enacted various
provisions, differing considerably in their scope. Sonora and Sinaloa, for ex-
ample, misinterpreting profit sharing as merely a means to augment wages,
stipulated that a worker must be allowed an annual bonus equivalent to an
extra month's pay.40 Colima and Jalisco, on the other hand, promulgated
laws which provided that three percent of the profits of agricultural enter-
prises and five to ten percent of the profits of industrial enterprises must go
to the businesses' employees." Another version of the original Con-
stitutional provisions was found in Oaxaca and Chihuahua, where any
profits exceeding a twenty percent annual rate of return were distributable
to the workers, yet the amount distributed could not exceed ten percent nor
be less than five percent of the workers' salaries.42 However, all of these dif-
ferent provisions did have one thing in common. They had insufficient time
in which to prove themselves, since all state labor laws became ineffective in
1929, when the federal government assumed complete authority over any
matter concerning labor. 3
37. Id. at 253.
38. id. at 254.
39. Id at 261.
40. Id. at 262.
41. Id. at 263.
42. Id. at 264.
43. See Demeure, Labor Legislation Considerations for American Companies Investing in
Mexico and South America.
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The political and legal status of profit sharing was brought into ques-
tion as the process of federalization occurred, because no federal statute was
passed to take the place of those state statutes that had implemented profit
sharing. The Constitution established that there was a right to profit shar-
ing, but it was now questionable whether this right was enforceable. The
Supreme Court, in the case of Cerveceria Moctezuma, S. A., held that it was
not, absent some federal legislation, giving effect to the Constitutional
provision.
4 4
This decision settled the legal status of profit sharing for a considerable
period of time, during which the political status of profit sharing was con-
stantly changing. Union support for the necessary federal legislation,
although initially nonexistent, gradually increased, giving rise to occasional
outbursts of strong backing, as evidenced by the demands in 1949 for fifty
percent worker participation in the profits of certain enterprises.
5 Some
members of the labor movement even thought "that labor leaders or labor
councils might participate in the governing of an enterprise.""
Not until 1961, however, does it appear that union support for profit
sharing was solidly and consistently expressed. In December of that year,
President Adolfo L6pez Mateos proclaimed that profit sharing should be
implemented by the federal government. He requested that Congress pass a
Constitutional reform, establishing a "National Commission, consisting of
representatives of the workers, of the owners, and of the government, to set
the percentage of profits that should be shared among the workers."
'47 He
specified that this reform should not compel new businesses to share their
profits, nor compel other businesses to do so when the National Commis-
sion deems them to be unsuitable for profit sharing. In a final note, he
emphasized that, "The right of the workers to participate in profits does not
imply authority to intervene in the direction or administration of enter-
prises.
'"4
On November 20, 1962, these recommendations were made law, and on
December 31, 1962, a national system of profit sharing was established.'
9
This reform of the federal labor law provided that the percentage of profits
to be shared must be set by the National Commissio.n in recognition of the
condition of the national economy, the necessity of industrial development,
the right of capital to obtain a reasonable return, and the desirability of en-
44. XII Semanario Judicial de la Federacihn 753 (1923).
45. A. Alvirez Friscione, supra note 20, at 268.
46. L. Padgett, The Mexican Political System 170 (1966).
47. Iniciativa de Reformas a las Fracciones II, Ill, VI, IX, XXI, XXII y XXXI del Inciso
"A" del Articulo 123 de la Constituci6n General de la Repfiblica, Diario Oficial, December 27,
1961.
48. Id.
49. Poder Ejecutivo, Diario Oficial, November 21, 1962.
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couraging reinvestment; 0 that the amount labeled as profits for the purpose
of effecting worker participation was to be the same as that reported for in-
come tax purposes;5' and that the amount distributable to the workers was
to be divided into two parts, one going to each worker equally and the other
according to their respective salaries.5 2 All enterprises were subject to this
system, except for the following: (1) Newly created enterprises, during the
first two years of operation; (2) newly created enterprises developing a new
product, during the first four years of production; (3) enterprises dedicated
to exploitation of natural resources, during the period of exploration; (4)
charities; (5) the Mexican Institute of Social Security, (6) public decen-
tralized institutions which have cultural or socially benevolent purposes;
and (7) other enterprises which have less than a certain amount of capital.53
All workers were subject to the system, except for the following: (1) direc-
tors, (2) administrators, (3) general managers, (4) apprentices, and (5)
domestic workers. 54 The law also stipulated that no worker was to receive an
amount of profits in excess of one month's salary,1 and that no worker was
to participate in the losses of any company.1
6
Generally, the workers were entitled to twenty percent of the dis-
tributable net profits of the firm where they worked." What was dis-
tributable was determined by establishing the book income for the year,
adding the provisions for capital and liability reserves, plus any provisions
for the increase of reserves for uncollectable accounts, and deducting the in-
come tax liability for that year and for any previous years.58 Thirty percent
of the resulting sum was then substracted in order to allow invested capital a
reasonable return and to stimulate reinvestment.5 9 An additional percen-
tage, determined by the difference between the amount of the respective
company's invested capital and the amount of its annual payroll, was also
subtracted, so as to compensate capital and labor according to their in-
50. Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley Federal del Trabajo, Diario Ofcial, December 31,
1962.
51. Id., art. 100-H.
52. Id., art. 100-M.
53. Id., art. 100-P.
54. Id., art. 100-Q 1, V.
55. Id., art. 100-Q I.
56. Id., art. 100-R.
57. Resoluci6n Aprobada por la Comisi6n Nacional para la Participaci6n de los Traba-
jadores en las Utilidades de las Empresas, art. i, Diario Oficia. December 13, 1963.
58. Id., art. 6 1.
59. Id., art. 6 II
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dividual contribution to the production of profits.60 For example, if a
business enterprise had capital worth less than twice the value of the labor
contributed, it could deduct an additional ten percent. However, if the
relative contribution of capital was greater, the deduction was greater, in-
creasing gradually to a maximum deduction of eighty percent, when the
capital was equivalent to more than thirty times the value of the labor con-
tributed.6
In any company, the accuracy of the above calculations could be
challenged by a majority of the workers or by their union through the filing
60. Id., Provision 65. With respect to this provision, Padgett, supra note 46, makes the
following observation:
"The important fact to remember from the standpoints both of foreign and
domestic firms is that the law makes allowances for taxes which the company must
pay and also for opportunities for reinvestment on the part of the company. The
Mexicans stress that one of the major reasons why such plans have failed or have not
done well in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina is that the importance
of reinvestment needs has not been recognized in the legislation in those countries.
Clearly, Mexican policy-makers expect to take some of the pressure off themselves
through this law, feeling that it is just one less thing which Communists can offer in
the way of distribution of wealth."
61. Id., Provision 66. An example of the entire computation, expressed in Mexican pesos,
of the employees' profit participation was provided in Arthur Andersen & Co., Tax and Trade
Guide - Mexico 113-14 (1972), as follows:
1. Net income after actual corporate income tax
payable (before profit sharing provision) ................. 1,800,000
2. Add nondeductible items (provisions for liability
reserves, provision to reserve for uncollectible ac-
counts, etc.) ........................................................... 200,000
3. Base net incom e ..................................................... 2,000,000
4. Less 30% of line 3 ........................................... 600,000
5. 70% of base net income ........................................... 1,400,000
6. Less adjustment factor:
6A Invested capital ........................................... 10,000,000
6B Total annual payroll ...................................... 3,250,000
Capital/payroll ratio (line 6A over line 6B) ...... 3.07





15.35% of line 5 ................................................ 214,900
7. Net income subject to employees' participation ....... 1,185,100
8. Amount due to employees (20% of line 7) ................ 237,020
9. Percentage of net profits before profit participation
(line 8 over line I) ................................................... 13.17%
10. Percentage of base net income (line 8 over line 3) ..... 11i.85%
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of a formal objection with the Secretarib de Hacienda y Cr'dito Phblico (the
Treasury Department) within thirty days after the company had made
available to them its annual income tax return. 62 If the Secretaria rendered a
final decision, the workers were prohibited from taking further legal action
against the company on the subject of the dispute. 63 Their initial legal action
did not, however, prevent them from demanding payment of the agreed
upon minimum share, which was due within sixty days after the date set for
payment of the company's annual income tax.6 4 Nor were the workers
forestalled from making profit sharing the subject of collective bargaining. 65
Yet the workers found that their real objections to the operation of the
profit sharing system could not be handled through collective bargaining,
nor through the filing of a formal complaint with the Secretarib. Their real
objections centered on the nature of the system, which they felt slighted their
Appendix F
TABLE FOR DETERNINING PERCENTAGE DEDUCTION
APPLICABLE TO 70% OF BASE NET INCOME FOR
PURPOSES OF EMPLOYEE PROFIT SHARING
Factor for Comparison Percentage Deduction
of Capital and Applicable to 70% of
Annual Payroll Base Net Income
Percentage Number to be
Applicable Applicable to
to Lower Excess Over
From To Limit Lower Limit
0 2.0 10 -
2 2.9 10 5.0
3 3.9 15 5 0
4 4.9 20 5.0
5 5.9 25 5,0
6 6.9 30 5.0
7 7.9 35 5.0
8 8.9 40 5.0
9 9.9 45 5.0
10 11.9 50 2.5
12 13.9 55 2.5
14 15.9 60 2.5
16 19.9 65 1.2
20 24.9 70 1.0
25 29.9 75 1.0
30 and above 80
In determining the ratio of capital to labor, branches of foreign companies were appar-
ently treated less favorably than Mexican firms. according to Hoagland, supra note 6, at D-25.
62. Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley Federal del Ttabajo, supra note 50, Article 100-K It.
63. Id., art. 100-K 1IL.
64. Id., art. 100-L.
65. No provision in the law prevented them from doing so under any condition. See art.
450, section V of Labor Law.
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interests through the application of a complicated, one-sided formula. Ap-
parently, many workers did not initially understand how their share of the
profits was to be computed. They expected to receive twenty percent of the
net profits and were surprised to learn that, once all the calculations were
made, only a small fraction of the net profits was actually distributable.1
6
They were also shocked that the basic percentage could be reduced if the
earnings of their company dropped below a certain level.
67
Employers were generally pleased with the early operation of the profit
sharing system, questioning only its denial of an income tax deduction for
the profits that were shared." But workers severely criticized the system for
allowing employers to mock the right of worker participation. In 1964, for
example, the head of one major union charged that of the 4,000 firms
originally affected by the profit sharing law, 3,000 failed to act in good faith
in carrying out their obligations." Others cited the small amount of profits
shared as proof of the system's inadequacy.70
Ten years' experience with the system did not alter their disillusion-
ment. In 1973, workers still complained about employers' lack of good faith,
alleging that the manner in which the system operated allowed employers to
understate their profits.7 Criticizing in particular the restrictiveness the
National Commission placed on the obtaining of information to verify em-
ployers' reports, 72 workers charged that, because of the Commission's
bureaucratic sluggishness and its marked indifference to the workers' posi-
tion, the system was inefficient and ineffective.7" They said that, for most
workers, profit sharing was "pure theory", 4 as indidicated by the fact that
of the 25,000 companies sharing their profits in 1973, 400 paid sixty-five per-
cent of all the profits distributed.75 They recommended that the complicated
profit sharing formula be eliminated, simplifying the system so that workers
could better protect their rights.76
66. Employees usually received from two to six percent of net profits. A. Alvirez
Friscione, supra note 30, at 486.
67. Exc6lsior, June 27, 1964.
68. See, e.g., the following cases before the Tribunal Fiscal: Juicio 3861/64, Sentencia de
la Primera Sala, January I1, 1965; and Juicio 1727/68, Resoluci6n de la S6ptima Sala, July 27,
1968. See also, Amparo Directo DA-354/75, September 23, 1975.
69. Exc6lsior, June 6, 1964.
70. See Padgett, supra note 46, at 173-75. From 1965 to 1970, profit sharing generally
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Employers, on the other hand, instead of criticizing the system, argued
that it was achieving all of its objectives. They continued to protest the "un-
constitutionality" of disallowing the deductability of profit sharing for in-
come tax purposes," yet praised profit sharing itself as an incentive that was
helping businesses to operate with greater efficiency, to increase produc-
tivity, and to produce larger profits. According to them, the system, besides
aiding the national economy, was insuring social justice. 8
They denied that businesses were avoiding compliance with the system.
They found it commendable that 400 of the nation's companies distributed
sixty-five percent of the profits in which workers shared. They indicated that
the 400 companies were highly labor-intensive and were paying eighty per-
cent of their profits to their employees, while other businesses paid as little
as ten percent because of their relatively greater amount of invested
capital.79 They objected to simplifying the system, feeling that simplification
would only produce inequity."' They also objected to workers' attempts to
examine their books, arguing that such examinations would interfere in the
conduct of their business and put company secrets into the hands of third
parties. 8' In short, they defended the status quo completely.
However, despite the employers' arguments, the strength of the
workers' basic objections to the system succeeded in altering the status quo.
In 1974, the law was changed.
Ill. THE LAW OF PROFIT SHARING
The new law entered into effect on October 15, 1974. In its preamble it
stated that profit sharing constitutes a valuable means of achieving
equilibrium between the factors of production and recognizing the contribu-
tion of labor to business enterprises.82 It also stated that profit sharing is an
important incentive for workers since it enables them to raise their standard
of living and achieve a more equitable distribution of the national wealth,
13
and that, by stimulating productivity, profit sharing is a vital factor in the
successful conduct of business.8 "
In view of the studies that had been conducted on the system of profit
sharing in its ten years of operation, the new law modified the system in two
fundamental respects. It made one percentage rate applicable to all com-
77. El Heraldo, December 3, 1973.
78. Excelsior, November 24, 1973.
79. Excelsior, November 13, 1973.
80. Exc6lsior, November 16, 1973.
81 Exc61sior, November 17, 1973.
82. Resoluci6n de la Comisi6n Nacional para la Participaci6n de los Trabajadores en las
Utilidades de las Empresas, Provision 2, Diario Oficial, October 14, 1974.
83. Id.. Provision 3.
84. Id.. Provision 4.
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panies," regardless of the amount of their income, providing that they were
not one of the companies that was exempt from the law's application.1 6 And
it eliminated the deductions that had previously been allowed to reflect the
ratio of capital to labor and to acknowledge the need for a reasonable rate
of return. 7 In so doing, the law eliminated the complicated calculations of
which the workers had complained.
The law provided that workers would participate in the profits of the
companies where they work at the flat rate of eight percent,88 without any
deductions whatsoever for their employers. s9 The new formula for determin-
ing the amount of distributable net profits was therefore the following: the
company's annual income, as determined by the Income Tax Law,90 less
their expenses, times eight percent. If a company's annual income was im-
possible to determine, then it could be estimated, just as it would be for the
payment of income tax. 9
The companies that were obligated to share their profits were broadly
defined as "all the economic units of production or distribution of goods or
services, in accord with the Federal Labor Law, . . . that have workers in
their service." 92 But, in practice, the same companies that had been excluded
from the application of the prior profit sharing law were excluded from the
application of the new law. 93
Also as before were the limitations on the amount of profits which
could be shared, Workers whose income was derived exclusively from the
rendering of their services, or was derived from the production of rents or
the collection of interest, were limited to a share that did not exceed the
amount of one month's salary. 94 Directors, general managers and ad-
ministrators were excluded from participation entirely. 9"
The payment of profit sharing to employees continued to be a non-
deductible expense for income tax purposes. As under the prior law, em-
ployers were also penalized by the provision which prohibited reducing
profits by the losses of previous years.
96
85, Id., Provisions 12, 13.
86. Id., art. 2, 12.
87. Id., Provision 6.
88. Id., art. 1.
89. Id.
90. Id., art. 3.
91. Id., art. 5, 6, & 9.
92. Id., art. 2.
93. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
94. Resoluci6n, supra note 82, art. 7.
95. See note 54 supra, and accompanying text.
96. Resoluci6n, supra note 82, art. 10.
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Under the new law, the National Commission retained the right to fix
and revise the percentage of profits that are distributable. 97 It also main-
tained the authority to conduct investigations and to undertake the studies
necessary to ascertain the general conditions of the national economy." In
addition, it remained obligated to act in recognition of the necessity of
promoting the nation's industrial development, a reasonable rate of return
on capital, and the reinvestment of capital in profit sharing enterprises. 99
The procedure for filing complaints against employers remained the
same under the new law,' 0 and the right to strike for failure to properly
share profits was reaffirmed.) 0'
The portion of profits that were distributable continued to be divided
into two parts, one to be paid in view of the respective salaries earned by
each employee and the other to be paid to all employees on an equal basis,
taking into consideration the number of days during which each employee
had worked. 102
The new law did not clearly state that profit sharing did not give
workers the right to participate in the administration of their company.
However, the absence of a statement to this effect could not be interpreted
to mean that workers may demand such a right by virtue of the new law,
since the profit sharing system is clearly based on the absence of this right.
What the new law may imply, however, is a decreasing emphasis on
allowing a reasonable rate of return and stimulating reinvestment. The
deduction which had been designed to serve these purposes was eliminated
in favor of affording workers greater simplicity in the determination of their
share of profits. The new law states that the National Commission continues
to be obligated to act in light of these purposes, yet it is questionable
whether the Commission does so now, after having shown that it does not
consider it of primary importance that these goals be served.
The failure to distinguish between the different types of companies also
indicates that the Commission has chosen to opt for improving the
procedural aspect of the profit sharing system, rather than make the distinc-
tions that are necessary to assure that capital and labor are compensated ac-
cording to their respective contributions. This emphasis on speed and ease
of application of the law's provisions should be reflected in the Commis-
sion's actions. It should be noted, however, that although the new law may
97. Id.. Provision 5.
98. Id., Provision 6.
99. id.
100. See notes 62 & 63 supra, and accompanying text.
101. See art. 450, Section V of the New Federal Labor Law, and E. Guerrero, supra note
20, at 353.
102. See note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
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facilitate ease of calculation and thereby speed up the procedure for the set-
tlement of disputes, the Commission did not deem it necessary to alter the
procedure drastically. It remains as restrictive as before.Workers were not
given the right to obtain more information on their company's performance
so as to allow them to better verify the annual income statements. The Com-
mission is therefore not likely to render much more assistance to workers
under the new law than it did under the old.
The impact of the changes in the law is likely to be perceived most
readily in the capital intensive industries. Since the ratio of capital to labor is
no longer recognized, workers in capital intensive industries may receive an
exceptionally large share of the profits, with the consequent disallowance of
a reasonable rate of return and the eventual discouragement of reinvest-
ment. Other industries are not as greatly affected by the new law. "Com-
panies having relatively substantial salary and wage costs were paying profit
sharing equivalent to around 7.5 percent of their pre-tax profits under the
former regulations."'103 It is insignificant that they now pay eight percent,
yet for the capital intensive industries, accustomed to paying two to six per-
cent, the impact of the eight percent rate is considerable.
However, even for these industries, it is encouraging that, in general,
profit sharing does not appear to inhibit the reinvestment of capital.
Statistics compiled by the Congress of Labor show that in 1965, there were
6,642 enterprises that shared their profits. In that year, 636,000 workers
benefited from profit sharing. In 1970, there were 36,000 enterprises par-
ticipating in the system - six times more than in 1965. The number of
workers benefited increased to 2,100,000 by 1970 - or three times more
than in 1965. During this period, although the amount received by each
worker remained virtually the same, the total amount of profits shared in-
creased from 407,000,000 to 1,312,000,000 pesos. And, while this increase
was occurring, the total amount of capital reinvested also tripled. In 1965,
the capital in the enterprises sharing their profits was valued at
35,500,000,000 pesos. By 1970, this figure increased to 118,000,000,000.
Similar statistics on the impact of the new law are not available, but since
the flat rate of eight percent is approximately the same as the effective rate
before the new law's enactment, there is no reason to expect that the current
effect of profit sharing on reinvestment would, for most industries, be sub-
stantially different than before. °'0
Unfortunately, however, the above statistics do not measure the success
of the profit sharing system. Avoiding the discouragement of reinvestment is
not a standard by which profit sharing may be evaluated, for the concept of
profit sharing has established for itself other tangible and intangible stan-
103. Price Waterhouse, Doing Business in Mexico 60-61 (1975)
104. A. Alvirez Friscione, supra note 20, at 560.
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dards by which it must be judged. Recall that profit sharing is designed to
supplement employees' income and to offer them added incentive; and it is
supposed to increase the well-being of the worker and, by lessening in-
dustrial tensions, the well-being of society; it is intended to foster produc-
tivity through a new cooperation between capital and labor. The new law on
profit sharing must be evaluated according to the extent to which it achieves
these and many other goals. It must be judged against the promises made by
the philosophy of profit sharing in Mexico.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Mexican philosophy of profit sharing is realistic. Profit sharing can
benefit both labor and capital, as Alvirez contends. But it is a concept which
can be easily misinterpreted, as the state laws implementing Article 123 in-
dicate. It is a concept which, in practice, can be too severely restricted, as,
for example, is the case when a worker is allowed to share in profits only to
the extent of a portion of his annual salary, or when a worker is allowed to
share in the benefits of an enterprise, without having to share any of the
risks. It is also a concept which can be too severely extended, as is the case
with the sociedad de solidaridad social, which permits labor to benefit at the
expense of capital, even to the extent of compromising the fundamental
right to hold private property.
Profit sharing in Mexico should not assume these extreme forms, which
are plainly contrary to the rationale underlying worker participation. The
National Commission on profit sharing pinpointed the primary charac-
teristics of an ideal system of profit sharing: (1) the system should recognize
that capital and labor both contribute to the production of profits, (2) the
system should view profits as being distinguished from salaries and wages,
and therefore (3) the system should make workers "participants in the
profits of the businesses where they work, from the precise moment in which
profits are generated, without placing importance on the amount of
same."'0 5 Any other application of the concept of profit sharing would
destroy "the roots of the constitutional institution" and, "as has happened
in other places when the theory of profit sharing has not been recognized in
its purity and an inoperative substitute has been established," would negate
a right of great importance. 06 Mexico should take the Commission's advice.
Mexico may be the nation that has best articulated the philosophy of
profit sharing. Yet, despite all that has been said about distinguishing bet-
ween the sharing of profits and the payment of wages, profit sharing in Mex-
ico is little more than a wage supplement. It is an expected annual bonus,
105. Resoluci6n Aprobada por la Primera Comisi6n Nacional para ]a Participaci6n de los
Trabajadores en las Utilidades, Provision 27, Diario Oficial, December 13, 1963.
106. Id.
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bearing a tangential relationship to the effort of the individual worker,
providing some added incentive, but not enough to allow those intangible
goals of profit sharing - a tremendous reduction of conflict in industrial
relations and a notable increase in the workers' sense of dignity - to be
achieved. Profit sharing in Mexico should instead encourage participation
between labor and capital in all areas of industrial relations, particularly in
risk-taking and in decision-making. It should make workers participants in
the profits of their enterprises at the precise moment the profits are realized,
"without placing importance on the amount of same,"'0 7 tying an im-
mediate and unlimited benefit to the effort of each worker. It should un-
dergo radical change, because, as is, it is an "inoperative substitute"' 8 for
the pure concept of profit sharing that Mexico has accepted in theory, yet
rejected in practice.
At present, the practice of profit sharing in Mexico may be seen by the
investor as meaning only an additional tax or another cost of business. By
the worker it may be seen as meaning a welcome supplement to one's in-
come, but no more. By the student of industrial relations it may be seen as
meaning a novel, yet limited, attempt to improve the position of labor.
However, all could find something of significant importance in the Mexican
philosophy that gave rise to this uninspiring reality. The Mexican
philosophy of profit sharing offers a glimpse of what could be, not only for
Mexico, but for all the countries that are experimenting with worker par-
ticipation.
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